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Abstract
The protection of critical infrastructures and the choices made in terms of priorities and cost, all impact upon
the planning, precautions and security aspects of protecting these important systems. Often the when choices
made is difficult to assess at the time the decision is taken and it is only after an incident that the truth of the
choices made become fully evident. The paper focuses on two recent examples of Australian Critical
Infrastructure protection and the issues that related to those examples.
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INTRODUCTION
The provision and delivery of many of the services that modern society enjoys are the result of ubiquitous
critical infrastructure systems that permeate many sectors of the Australian community. Moreover, the
integration of technological enhancements and networking interconnections between critical infrastructure
systems has heightened system availability and resilience, including the efficient delivery of services to
consumers throughout Australia. However, the reliance on these services and their supporting systems is
evermore critical: as the removal, temporary loss, degradation or destruction of a single or multiple systems
would have a detrimental impact across many sectors of Australian society. With this increasing integration and
societal dependence on critical infrastructure systems, their security, availability and protection becomes
increasingly significant.
The broader Australian community has an expectation that services such as power and water will be available
when desired and that it will be provided as expected in a safe manner. These services and others are provided
by various infrastructure systems dedicated to producing and or providing these services seamlessly to all
consumers within our modern society. Therefore, by community expectation and necessity, the protection of
these critical infrastructure systems is an imperative to governments, infrastructure owners and consumers.
The nature of these critical infrastructure systems and their systematic interconnection display attributes of
highly structured, complex interconnected networks that characterise the issues of dependency and
interdependency relationships, which by necessity exist between infrastructures to facilitate the supply of
services. This is particularly prevalent when considering the energy sector, where for instance the continuity of
the supply of electricity is crucial to many other sectors of Australia’s critical infrastructure for their ongoing
provision of services to the community at large (Scott, 2005).
In the Australian context some common examples of critical infrastructure systems and services to the
community, rely on electricity; water; gas and fuel; health services; telecommunications, and banking and
financial services to name a few (AGD 2008). Furthermore, other services that are regarded as critical
infrastructures in other national contexts may include: air transportation; ground transportation (for example,
interstate trucking, railroads, highways, bridges); telephone; cellular telephone; internet; sewers; food
distribution and social events (for example, shopping, sports, entertainment) (Smith 2002). However, critical
infrastructures are vulnerable and can be damaged, destroyed or disrupted by breakdowns, negligence, natural
disasters, accidents, cyber incidents, illegal criminal activity and malicious damage. So it is for these and other
reasons that drives the need to protect the continuity of supply against such hazards and threats. It is the aim of
government policy and also that of infrastructure owners and operators, to ensure continued supply through
identifying and implementing improved security, protective safeguards and analysis in response to the identified
threats, vulnerabilities and weaknesses posed (Scott, 2005; Bentley, 2006).
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Therefore, protecting critical infrastructure systems from damage and maintaining system functionality,
resilience and delivery of the services to the community, requires ethical choices to be made by governments,
owners and emergency services, particularly during times of natural disaster.
This paper investigates the choices that arise with regard to managing threats to critical infrastructure systems
during times of disaster or when the critical infrastructure system itself becomes the risk.

BACKGROUND
In terms of defining critical infrastructure, the specific Australian determination is as follows (TISN 2004, p.3):
“Critical infrastructure is defined as those physical facilities, supply chains, information technologies and
communication networks which, if destroyed, degraded or rendered unavailable for an extended period, would
significantly impact on the social or economic well-being of the nation, or affect Australia’s ability to conduct
national defence and ensure national security.”
The diffusion of critical infrastructures permeates across many sectors of the Australian community and
economy including banking and finance, transport and distribution, energy, utilities, health, food supply,
communications and even key government services and national icons. Some elements are not strictly physical
infrastructure and may be ‘virtual’ in terms of internet-based electronic supply chains for example, or other
networks that support the delivery of all important products, information or services (TISN 2003,
2004).Generally, these modern critical infrastructure systems exist securely and seamlessly within our
environment and provide many of the services and resources that Australians utilise on an everyday basis; be it
at home, work or leisure.

Security and the Environment
Likewise environmental change and its affect can have an impact on human security in a number of ways. If
considered from an anthropogenic perspective, it can cause conflict and it can degrade the resources available to
human societies (for example, by decreasing biodiversity, by clearing such items as mangrove swamps and
forests, by decreasing cropland). Furthermore, such impacts upon the environment can disrupt the very
economic base of societies. So to summarise the impact of the natural environment on security, it can be stated
that:
x The natural environmental can provide a source of conflict over natural resources and services by their
decrease and unequal distribution (Klare, 2001; Renner; 2002);
x

Environmental change can affect human security by producing situations that adversely affect human
health and well-being for example, drought, food shortages, bio-security threats, chemical
contamination and availability of usable land. Also it can directly affect society’s infrastructure for
example, climate change can cause an increase in bushfires which in themselves can threaten water
supplies (by contamination) and power supply (by destruction of power lines and generation facilities);

x

Human military and industrial activity can seriously affect environmental health and therefore human
security.

However, this is taking a very human-centred approach where the object to be ‘secured’ is the human and
associated systems. A more eco-centric viewpoint would be concerned with the security of regional or global
eco-systems. Even the concept of sustainability – both ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ which determine whether natural and
human capital are considered complements rather than substitutes are considered from a human perspective. In a
sense, it is difficult not to do this. However, it is possible to attempt to draw the boundary around a security
problem to actively include them on an equal footing with infrastructure systems.

Critical Infrastructure Protection
The implementation of protective measures aimed at securing critical infrastructure systems requires a
considered approach, as there are many variables involved in establishing and maintaining a balance between
security and functionality of service delivery and system availability. A key part of the greater national
infrastructure security picture is the continued availability of critical infrastructure systems that provide and
deliver services to the community, to which it has become increasingly reliant.
The underlying premise is that through their pervasiveness nature, these systems and services have become
crucial to an improved standard of living for the community generally. Therefore, it is the convenience and
availability of these critical infrastructure system services, together with the community’s expectations, which
leads to potential social issues when the security of these systems is threatened, fails or experiences a reduced
level of service and availability. Depending upon the amount of time, how and which critical infrastructure
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system or multiple systems thereof are affected, will invariably determine community reaction, incident
management and contingency responses that will in turn influence the likely response and recovery actions
instigated at governmental, business, personal and wider economic levels.
The perception is that critical infrastructure systems and the services they deliver remain largely in the
background, seamlessly providing the services that support the standard of living enjoyed by most highly
industrialised societies, with their contribution largely going unnoticed until an incident occurs.

THE 2009 VICTORIAN BUSHFIRE – BACKGROUND
The following case studies highlight the issues that the Victorian Bushfires created in regards to Critical
Infrastructure Protection.
The 7th of February, 2009 was a day of unprecedented tragedy in the state of Victoria, Australia. One hundred
and seventy-three people died in one of the worst bushfires in Australian history. About 430,000 hectares of
land were burnt, as well as 2000 properties and 61 businesses, and the loss of one hundred and seventy-three
lives (Teague et al, 2009). One of the issues that has not been discussed about the tragic event has been the
security implications and in particular the security repercussions in terms of protecting Critical Infrastructure
and when the Critical Infrastructure becomes at risk.

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION CASE STUDY 1: WATER
The following Case Study: Victorian bushfires and its environmental security impact, discusses the impact of a
natural threat impact a critical infrastructure (Hutchinson & Warren 2009).
Victoria is one of the smaller states in mainland Australia with a population of 5.17 million (Australian Bureau
of Statistics, 2008), and its capital city Melbourne has a population of 3.19 million (Australian Bureau of
Statistics 2009). This highlights that in the state of Victoria, the majority of the population lives within a single
city. This has implications for a number of key services that relate to Melbourne, one of the most important
issues being the provision of water.
The majority of Melbourne's water comes from within 160,000 hectares of uninhabited forested catchments
north east of Melbourne, Victoria (Melbourne Water 2009a).The impact of the Victorian bushfire was that
around 30% of Melbourne's catchments were damaged by fire. This was mostly centred on the O'Shannassy and
Maroondah catchments (Melbourne Water2009b). A detailed analysis of the damage is shown in Table 1.
Catchment

Fire
affected

Area burnt
estimate

Reservoirs
with
catchment
Thomson
No
None
Upper Yarra
Yes
About 2% burnt
Maroondah
Yes
About 75% burnt
O'Shannassy
Yes
About 93% burnt
Yan Yean
No
None
Tarago
Yes
About 50% burnt
Table 1: Catchment Impact Table (Melbourne Water 2009b)

Share of total reservoir inflow

36%
19%
12%
12%
2% (not in supply)
Nil (not used for Melbourne's water supply)

During the actual bushfire, a number of key actions were taken and issues raised, regarding water supplies, these
included (Roberts 2009):
x

The transfer of ten billion litres of water in pipes from the Upper Yarra dam to smaller dams, this was
to safeguard the existing water supply;

x

The major concern that the run-of ash into reservoirs would contaminate Melbourne’s water supplies. If
reservoirs were contaminated, it would be contaminated for three months and impact 24% of
Melbourne’s drinking water.

In reality, the impact of damages caused by bushfire upon catchments areas was not as great as first feared, the
actual damage related to (Melbourne Water 2009c) was:
x

Damage to water supply infrastructure was limited to minor things such as weir gates;
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x

The Maroondah aqueduct system escaped major damage but had been experiencing blockages in places
by fallen trees and landslides;

x

Some movement of soil following the rains since the fires, particularly in the Wallaby Creek area. This
is usual with high intensity fires;

x

Wallaby Creek sustained considerable damage in burned area and infrastructure;

x

A number of buildings have been lost, including the historic Wallaby Creek Quarters complex.

The Victorian bushfires had the potential to damage the water supply of a major global city. Thankfully, the
impact was not as severe as first thought. From a critical infrastructure protection perspective, it raises an
interesting question about how can the water supplies be protected against such an occurrence. The issue is that
reservoirs can only be built in areas of high rainfall; alternative solutions such as building pipelines to transfer
water across the state can be very expensive, and they would not be immune to fire damage and could cause an
unacceptable environmental impact. Perhaps the announcement of the building of a new desalination plant in the
State of Victoria, that will provide 150 billion litres of water a year, could be a the solution from a security
perspective (Brumby, 2009).
The summary of issues in relation to this case study was the magnitude of consequences. The extent of the
Victorian bushfires was considerable. They created a major risk to Melbourne’s water supply which could
impact all of Melbourne’s population.
Due to the fact the fire spread very quickly, decisions had to be made regarding the protection of people,
property and critical infrastructure.
The fire had the potential to impact the majority of the population in the state of Victoria and decisions has to
made not just to protect the local population but also larger populations in case the fire spread.

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION CASE STUDY 2: POWER
The second case study is an example of where the critical infrastructure rather than becoming an asset to be
protected, it became a major risk and in this case actually caused fires and loss of property and life. The
following section is based upon an assessment of the Victorian Royal Bushfire Commission (2010a, 2010b, and
2010c).
The age and maintenance of the Victorian power infrastructure systems became a major during the Royal
Commission. During the bushfires on the February 2009, five of the eleven major fires that began that day were
caused by failed electricity assets; among the fires was that at Kilmore East, as a result of which 119 people
died, this fire was caused by electrical arcing after a conductor (which was probably 43 years old) on the
Pentadeen Spur line broke.
Evidence put to the Royal Commission suggests that the age of electricity distribution assets contributed to three
fires on 7 February 2009, these were:
•

the Kilmore East fire—conductor failure caused by fatigue on a SWER (Single wire earth return)
line13;

•

the Coleraine fire—fatigue and corrosion leading to a broken tie wire and as a consequence a
conductor starting a fire on a SWER line14;

•

the Horsham fire—fallen conductor caused by failed pole cap on a SWER line15.

The SWER (Single wire earth return) power infrastructure system is old, having been introduced by the State
Electricity Commission of Victoria in the early 1950s to provide a means of electricity distribution to rural areas
with low population densities and where small electrical loads need to be widely dispersed. The system could be
rolled out relatively cheaply because of its simple design, which consists of a single lightweight, high-tensile
conductor mounted on poles. Electricity travels to the customer along the single wire, the current returning
through the earth rather than through a second wire.
The SWER design’s simplicity offered some bushfire mitigation features because the single line could not clash
with other lines and there were fewer poles and less associated infrastructure that could fail. The SWER design
limits a SWER line’s maximum current, though, and thus the number of customers the line can service; on the
SP AusNet network an average SWER line serves just 45 customers. SP AusNet recognises that the SWER
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network is reaching thermal capacity and that some SWER lines are already overloaded. This raises questions
about the SWER system’s capacity to meet present and future demand and maintain supply quality.
Against the background of aging Victorian power infrastructure, the Royal Commission, identified a number of
key issues with the systems, which are:
•

Aging conductors – a key report of SP AusNet’s conductor study noted that the great majority of
conductor failures on the organisation’s network involved high-voltage conductors and that this
represented a ‘considerable risk to the business from a public safety and bushfire perspective’. The
report said, ‘In the absence of planned conductor replacement programs, failure rates may begin to
increase at an exponential rate due to the increasing proportion of [the] conductor fleet
approaching current failure age ranges’;

•

Insulator failure - Insulator failure can result in pole fires, cross-arm fires, conductor drops,
conductor clashing, and conductor contact with the ground. Such incidents constitute bushfire
risks;

•

Aging assets - There is a substantial peak in the age of assets, indicated by the example of wood
poles. In 2004 there are 37,000 wood poles 50 years and older, however this will increase to
approximately 62,000 by 2010 based on average replacement of 1,500 wood poles per year;

•

Impact of external elements - studies examined the circumstances of the tie-wire failure that led to
the Coleraine fire on 7 February. The study found that the typical life span for zinc galvanising on
tie wires of that kind is about 40 years and that the Coleraine tie wire was probably more than 40
years old. The study noted the galvanising on that tie wire had been consumed by external
elements, greatly increasing the corrosion rate and leading to pitting and the initiation of fatigue
cracks on the tie wire.

The key recommendations from the Royal Commission in relation to power infrastructure were:
•

The progressive replacement of all SWER (single-wire earth return) power lines in Victoria with
aerial bundled cable, underground cabling or other technology that delivers greatly reduced
bushfire risk. The replacement program should be completed in the areas of highest bushfire risk
within 10 years and should continue in areas of lower bushfire risk as the lines reach the end of
their engineering lives

•

The progressive replacement of all 22-kilovolt distribution feeders with aerial bundled cable,
underground cabling or other technology that delivers greatly reduced bushfire risk as the feeders
reach the end of their engineering lives. Priority should be given to distribution feeders in the areas
of highest bushfire risk.

The Victorian state government premier response to the power-line replacement recommendations was "it
literally out of this world, it's $20b plus, and secondly, you could do all of that and you still get fires that are
caused by machinery… lightning… arson." The Victorian state Government will set up a $2m taskforce, to
work with industry to identify high priority areas for upgrading powerlines (ABC, 2010).
The summary of issues in relation to this case study again was the magnitude of consequences. The magnitude
of the Victorian bushfires was considerable. A major difference in this case study was that in many cases the
critical infrastructure caused the fires and by doing so destroyed parts of itself. The initial impact of the failure
was localised in the vicinity of the fire, but due to environmental conditions these fires quickly spread. There
was not a major risk to Melbourne’s power supply immediately, even though a later fire in Gippsland did put
Melbourne’s power supply at risk by threatening the power cables from the La Trobe power station complex.
Due to the fact the fire spread very quickly, decisions had to be made regarding the protection of people,
property and critical infrastructure. At the time there was no realisation that the power infrastructure had caused
the fires.
The loss of the power service impacted localised communities and in many cases impacted their ability to fight
the fires or communicate the situation or developing situation.

CONCLUSION
Security implications are inherent in all critical infrastructure related protection decisions. Decision makers
should be aware of the stance and assumptions they are making in regard to these issues and be aware of the
implications of the stand point taken. The issue is that protection of critical infrastructure can easily be
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identified, but when the critical infrastructure becomes the risk, especially with ageing critical infrastructure,
this could pose new critical infrastructure protection issues.

REFERENCES
ABC (Australian Broadcasting Corporation) (2010) John Brumby details the State Government response to the
Bushfires Royal Commission, URL: http://www.abc.net.au/local/stories/2010/08/27/2995659.htm
Accessed 1st September, 2010.
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2008) Report 1301 - Year Book Australia, 2008, Canberra, Australia.
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2009) Report 3218 - Regional Population Growth, Australia, 2007-08,
Canberra, Australia.
AGD (2008) Critical Infrastructure Protection, Australian Government Attorney-General's Department.URL:
http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/agd.nsf/Page/Nationalsecurity_CriticalInfrastructureProtection Accessed:
April 2008.
Bentley A. (2006) Infrastructure: Critical Mass, CSIRO Solve, No.7.
Brumby, J. (2009) Australia’s biggest desalination plant to secure water and jobs, Victorian State Government,
30th July.
Hutchinson, W., Warren, M. (2009) Security as an element in environmental assessment and decision making,
Proceedings of The 2009 Conference of the Australia and New Zealand Society for Ecological Economics
(ANZSEE): Green Mileage in the Global Meltdown: An Ecological Economics Way Forward, Darwin,
Australia, 27th-30th October 2009.
Klare, M.T. (2001) Resources Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict, Metropolitan Books, New York.
Melbourne Water (2009a) Bushfires in Catchments, URL:
http://www.melbournewater.com.au/content/water_storages/bushfires_in_catchments/bushfires_in_
catchments.asp Accessed, 21st September, 2009.
Melbourne Water (2009b) Catchment Impact Table, URL:
http://www.melbournewater.com.au/content/water_storages/bushfires_in_catchments/february_200
9_-_catchment_impact_table.asp Accessed, 21st September, 2009.
Melbourne Water (2009c) Bushfire Recovery Community Update, 19th May.
Scott G. (2005) Protecting the Nation, AUSGEO News (Geoscience Australia), Issue No.79.
Smith R. (2002) Complexities of Simulating Domestic Infrastructure Protection, Titan Systems Corporation,
Orlando, FA, USA.
Teague, B., McLeaod, R., Pascoe, S. (2009) 2009 - Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission Interim Report,
Victorian State Government, Melbourne.
TISN (2003) Fact Sheet: What is Critical Infrastructure? Trusted Information Sharing Network (TISN),
Canberra.
TISN (2004) Critical Infrastructure Protection National Strategy, Trusted Information Sharing Network
(TISN).URL:
http://www.tisn.gov.au/agd/WWW/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(930C12A9101F61D43493D44C70E84EAA)
~National+CIP+Strategy+2.1+final.PDF/$file/National+CIP+Strategy+2.1+final.PDF Accessed:
April 2008.
Renner, M. (2002) The Anatomy of Resource Wars, World Watch Paper 162, Worldwatch Institute, USA.

35 | P a g e

Proceedings of the 11th Australian Information Warfare Conference

Victorian Royal Bushfire Commission (2010a) Final Report Volume 1- The Fires and the Fire-related Deaths,
Victorian Parliament, Australia, ISBN 978-0-9807408-2-0.
Victorian Royal Bushfire Commission (2010b) Final Report Volume 2 - Fire Preparation, Response and
Recovery, Victorian Parliament, Australia, ISBN 978-0-9807408-3-7.
Victorian Royal Bushfire Commission (2010c) Final Report Summary, Victorian Parliament, Australia, ISBN
978-0-9807408-1-3.

36 | P a g e

